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Contemporary theories of consciousness can be divided along several major 
faultlines, but one of the most prominent concerns the question of whether they accept 
the principle that a mental state’s being conscious involves essentially its subject 
being aware of it. Call this the awareness principle: 
(Awareness)  For any mental state M of a subject S (at a time t), M is conscious 
(at t) only if S is aware of M (at t). 
Although analytic philosophers divide sharply on whether to accept the principle, the 
philosophy-of-mind literature appears to contain mainly arguments against it (e.g., 
Dretske 1993), rather than for it. One reason is that those who accept the principle 
often find themselves in a certain dialectical embarrassment: they take the principle to 
be so self-evident as to allow no cogent argument that would derive it from truths 
even more obvious than it. In what follows, I want to develop and defend an argument 
for Awareness. The argument is not new—in fact it is very old—but my specific 
development and defense of it are. The basic idea, presented originally by the sixth-
century Indian philosopher Dignāga, is a combination of two thoughts: (i) all 
conscious states are states whose subject can remember at least at some later time, and 
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(ii) we can remember only events of which we were aware at the time of their 
occurrence. 
 I open, in §1, with brief comments on the dialectical and historical context of 
the argument. In §2, I offer an initial formulation of the argument, and compare it to 
some previous formulations. I consider various objections to the argument’s first 
premise in §3, and to its second premise in §4. Some of these objections will occasion 
modifications of the argument’s premises, so in §5 I will collect these modifications 




Arguments for Awareness tend to come as part of a case for a stronger thesis, namely, 
that every conscious state involves essentially a reflexive awareness of itself. Call this 
the reflexivity theory: 
(Reflexivity)  For any mental state M of a subject S (at a time t), M is conscious 
(at t) only if S is aware of M (at t) in virtue of being in M. 
Reflexivity goes beyond Awareness in claiming that the subject’s awareness of her 
own conscious state is built into that very state. Once we accept that being in a 
conscious state M requires being aware of M, the question arises of whether (a) the 
subject is aware of M in virtue of being in some other mental state M*, or (b) she is 
aware of M in virtue of being in M itself. Awareness takes no stand on this, but 
Reflexivity explicitly commits to option (b).  
 Because the reflexivity theory is stronger than the awareness principle in this 
way, the task of arguing for the former can be factorized into two parts. Part 1 is to 
argue that the subject must be aware of M for M to be a conscious state. Part 2 is to 
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argue that this awareness is due to the subject being in M itself, not in virtue of being 
in some other mental state. This second task has typically been addressed through an 
infinite-regress argument, according to which (very roughly) the supposition that a 
subject is aware of her conscious state in virtue of being in some numerically distinct 
mental state leads to an infinite regress of occurrent mental states. The debate on this 
argument has been lively both in Western and Eastern philosophy, but I set it aside 
here. For the part of the argument for Reflexivity that has embarrassed proponents 
more deeply has been the first: the task of arguing that conscious states must involve 
some awareness of them in the first place.  
 As noted, the source of the embarrassment is the feeling that Awareness is so 
‘axiomatic’ that it is virtually impossible to find principles of even greater antecedent 
plausibility to derive Awareness from. But those who think that Awareness is too self-
evident and too basic to be grounded in something even more fundamental still have 
this dialectical option: to clutch at an uncontroversial symptom of this awareness and 
work their way back to what might underlie that symptom.  
This strategy is at play in an ancient argument for Awareness that makes its 
first appearance, to my knowledge, in the sixth-century manuscript Pramāṇa-
samuccaya by the Indian Buddhist philosopher Dignāga. The argument is then 
discussed by a number of 7th- and 8th-century Buddhist philosophers, notably 
Dharmakīrti, Kumārila, and Candrakīrti. It has also garnered considerable attention in 
recent Buddhist scholarship (see Williams 1998, Ganeri 1999, Perrett 2003, Yao 
2005, Garfield 2006, Kellner 2010, and Thomspon 2011), with recent treatments by 
Kellner (2010, 2011) reaching new levels of scholarly rigor and meticulousness. Here 
I will take greater philosophic license, if you will, and use Dignāga’s words to 
develop what I take to be the strongest argument in the area.1 
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2. The Argument 
 
Dignāga writes that ‘it is unheard of to have a recollection of something without 
having experienced [it before]’ (1:11d); he then reasons that since ‘memory arises 
after experience, for the cognition just as for the object’ (1:11c), this shows that we 
experience our experiences at the time these occur.2 The point may be put as follows. 
I have nice memories of Obama’s inauguration, but do not remember Bush’s. I also 
do not remember Lincoln’s. But the reason I do not remember Bush’s and the reason I 
do not remember Lincoln’s are very different: Bush’s I had already forgotten, but if I 
had a better memory, I could very well remember it; Lincoln’s I could never be said 
to remember, for the simple reason that I was not aware of it when it took place. To be 
coherently said to remember event x, it would seem one has to be aware of x when x 
takes place. Call this the awareness constraint on remembering. 
 The constraint applies not only to the remembering of external events, such as 
presidential inaugurations, but also to internal events, such as a thought occurring to 
one or an experience being enjoyed by one. Thus, I remember smelling fresh-brewed 
coffee in our kitchen this morning. (I remember the coffee and its odor, but in 
addition, I also remember my experience of that odor; the latter is an internal event.) 
And I remember thinking that I should get some of that coffee. Given the awareness 
constraint on remembering, it follows that when my experience and my thought were 
taking place, I was aware of their taking place. 
 The crucial claim of the argument is that every conscious state is memorable, 
in the weak sense that it is possible for the subject to remember its occurrence at some 
later time. If so, then given the awareness constraint on remembering, every conscious 
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state is such that its subject was aware of it at the time of its occurrence. To a first 
approximation, the argument may be presented, informally, as follows: 
1) A subject can remember an event E only if she was aware of E when E 
occurred; 
2) Every conscious state is such that there is some later time at which its subject 
can remember it; therefore, 
3) Every conscious state is such that its subject is aware of it at the time of its 
occurrence. 
A more hard-nosed presentation might be:  
1) For any subject S, event E, and times t and t*, such that (i) E occurs at t and 
(ii) t*>t, if S can remember at t* the occurrence of E, then S is aware at t of 
E;3  
2) For any subject S, conscious state C, and time t, such that C is a state of S and 
C occurs at t, there is a time t*, t*>t, such that S can at t* remember the 
occurrence of C; therefore, 
3) For any subject S, conscious state C, and time t, such that C is a state of S and 
C occurs at t, S is aware of the occurrence of C at t. 
In the next two sections, I examine the plausibility of each premise. The examination 
will produce various modifications and refinements that will hopefully lead us nearer 
an unobjectionable version of the argument. 
 Before doing so, a disclaimer: the reconstruction offered above is certainly not 
the first formal reconstruction of Dignāga’s argument. A number of contemporary 
scholars have already offered formal or quasi-formal reconstructions of it (e.g., Ganeri 
1999, Kellner 2011, Thompson 2011). However, these reconstructions typically run 
together the two tasks of an argument for Reflexivity distinguished above, whereas 
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the reconstruction proposed here attempts to distill the part of the reasoning that 
supports just Awareness. In consequence, in my reconstruction assumes a 
considerably more straightforward (and correspondingly more defensible) form. To 
underscore this point, compare the following reconstruction, to my knowledge the 
latest in the extant literature:  
 
1. When one remembers (say) yesterday’s vivid blue sky, one remembers not simply the blue 
sky, but also seeing the blue sky. In other words, one remembers not just the object seen, but 
also the visual experience of seeing. Thus the memory comprises both the objective side of the 
perception (the object seen) and the subjective side of the perception (the seeing). 
(Phenomenological claim)  
2. Thus no additional cognition is necessary in order to recall the subjective side of the original 
experience. (Phenomenological claim)  
3. To remember something one must have experienced it. (Conceptual claim)   
4. The causal basis for features of the present memory is corresponding features of the past 
experience. (Causal claim) 
5. So the past visual perception must have included an experience of the seeing, along with the 
object seen. In other words, the perception must have included an awareness of itself as a 
visual perception, which is to say that it must have been reflexively self-aware. (Conclusion) 
(Thompson 2011, 162) 
 
In Thompson’s hands Dignāga’s argument requires additional premises (and 153 
words instead of just 57!). In consequence, the argument takes a more cumbersome 
form, making Thompson concede that it is ‘debatable’ whether it is deductively valid 
and forcing him to construe it as a nondeductive argument by ‘inference to the best 
explanation’ (ibid.). This may have something to do with the fact that the conclusion 
of the argument, as reconstructed by Thompson, goes beyond the awareness principle 
and explicitly commits to the reflexivity theory. My own reconstruction aims to 
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establish nothing more than the awareness principle, and is accordingly simpler and 
more agile. It is unquestionable that the two-premise argument imputed presented 
above is deductively valid. The only question is how plausible the premises are. 
 
3. The First Premise 
 
Our first premise is that a subject can remember an event only if she was aware of it 
when it occurred. An immediate objection might be that one can remember that 
Napoleon lost the Battle of Waterloo on 18 June 1815 without having even been alive 
that day, let alone aware of Napoleon’s loss.  
 The correct response is to distinguish different kinds of remembering and get 
clear on the kind relevant to the argument. Psychologists distinguish between 
‘episodic’ and ‘semantic’ memory (Tulving 1972). The former is an experiential 
memory involving recollection of past personal events; the latter is merely a form of 
propositional knowledge stored in long-term memory. In those terms, the kind of 
memory relevant to our argument is the episodic variety, but the one relevant to 
Napoleon is the semantic variety. Note that canonical reports of episodic memory take 
nominal complements (‘S remembers x’), whereas canonical reports of semantic 
memory take that-clause complements (‘S remembers that p’). It is thus significant 
that although I can be said to remember that Napoleon lost at Waterloo, I cannot 
(correctly) be said to remember Napoleon’s loss at Waterloo. Our first premise is 
framed in terms of objectual rather than propositional remembering, which indicates 
that it concerns episodic memory; but to remove any uncertainties we may explicitly 
add the qualifier ‘episodic’ in it (and accordingly in the second premise as well). 
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Admittedly, a current-day madman may think he is Napoleon, and may report 
episodically remembering losing the Battle of Waterloo. He may even undergo 
imagery that, let us stipulate, happens to be qualitatively indistinguishable from 
Napoleon’s largely veridical perceptual experiences on the day. Nonetheless, I think 
we can all recognize that unless he was in Waterloo on 18 June 1815, our madman 
cannot be truly said to remember losing the Battle. He may be said to be under the 
impression that he remembers losing the battle, or said to seem to remember it, but 
cannot be said to in fact remember it. If this is not a case of remembering, then it 
cannot constitute any counterexample to our first premise, since that premise is a 
claim about remembering.4  
A second objection is that there are cases where we can be (correctly) said to 
remember an event even though we became aware of it only a certain amount of time 
after its occurrence. For example, I can be said to remember the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
even though I became aware of the attacks only two hours after their occurrence.  
In response, I would say that in the strictest sense, I cannot quite be said to 
remember the attacks of 9/11. Strictly speaking, I can be said to remember the 
televised images of the attack, and can also be said to remember the drama of that 
day; and one may usefully describe this as ‘remembering 9/11’ or even ‘remembering 
the 9/11 attacks.’ But in the strictest sense, only those who witnessed the planes 
hitting the towers, or the towers coming down, can be said to remember the attacks. 
Perhaps our premises should be strengthened with an explicit ‘in the strictest sense,’ 
but they are not fundamentally threatened by such cases.  
More threatening are cases of delay built into the very nature of the original 
awareness. I can certainly be said to remember the sun being at location L earlier 
today, even though light takes a little over eight minutes to travel from the sun to the 
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earth, so that in reality I was not aware of the sun being at location L at the time that it 
was, but only eight minutes thereafter.  
I can see two possible approaches to responding to this objection. One is to 
loosen sufficiently the relevant notion of simultaneity to allow for whatever additional 
time is needed for the causal process whereby E causes perception-of-E. The other 
option is to restrict the scope of the first premise to ‘nearby events,’ understood as 
events for which there is no pertinent time lag between their occurrence and 
perceptual awareness of their occurrence. (What does ‘pertinent’ mean? Perhaps: the 
time lag is shorter than the ‘specious present’ [James 1890], commonly thought to last 
about two seconds.) This second approach is inviting, because such a time lag is 
irrelevant to our awareness of our own conscious states, so the latter’s occurrences are 
in that sense ‘nearby events.’ I suggest we adopt this second option, since it requires 
least substantive philosophical commitment.  
With the appropriate modifications in place, our first premise now reads: 
1) A subject can episodically remember a nearby event E, in the strictest 
sense, only if she was aware of E when E occurred. 
This version of the premise overcomes the proposed putative counterexamples. In the 
absence of other counterexamples, we should therefore accept it, at least 
provisionally. 
 
4. The Second Premise 
 
The second premise in the overall argument is that every conscious state is such that 
there is some later time at which its subject can remember it. Obviously, this does not 
say that every conscious state is such that its subject actually remembers it at some 
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future time. The claim is only about the possibility of remembering. Nor does the 
premise say that conscious states are such that at every future time their subject can 
remember them. The claim is only that for each conscious states there is at least one 
future time at which the subject can remember it.5 Perhaps that time occurs just five 
seconds after the experience, perhaps (also) a year later. But there is at least one time 
at which it is possible for the subject to remember her conscious state. (Thus it would 
be misguided to object that our second premise denies conscious experiences to 
amnesiacs. For while amnesiacs lack long-term memory, they certainly have working 
memory and could in principle remember an experience a couple of seconds after it 
took place.) 
It might be objected that this premise is question-begging: insofar as 
Dignāga’s opponent holds that we are not generally aware of our conscious 
experiences, she will happily deny that we remember them. In fact, she may claim 
that we only remember what our conscious experiences are of, not the conscious 
experiences themselves. Indeed, this appears to have been Kumārila’s objection to 
Dignāga. 
In reality, however, there are independent reasons to think completely unstable 
the notion that episodic memory presents external events but does not present our 
original conscious awareness of them. We can see this in the way the view returns 
intuitively wrong results on the veridicality of certain memories (see, e.g., Fernández 
2006). Suppose that in eighth grade Taylor smiled at me once during recess, but that I 
underwent a visual illusion at the time that made me convinced it was Sasha who 
smiled at me; for many years I would often reminisce about that one time the very 
popular Sasha had smiled at me. Then I get older, get married, and my memory of my 
schoolyard days becomes increasingly foggy. One day, in the autumn of my life, I 
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reminisce again about the good old days and seem to remember Taylor smiling at me 
during recess. Intuitively, I am misremembering – it is, after all, a kind of memory 
malfunction that conjures in me the episodic memory of Taylor smiling at me. But 
since this is what in fact happened, the view under consideration – the view that what 
episodic memory represents are only the external objects of our experience, not our 
experiences themselves – returns the result that I am remembering correctly. 
The lesson is that either (a) episodic memory represents our experiences of 
external objects rather than these objects themselves, or (b) it represents both our 
experiences and their objects – perhaps even represents the objects by representing 
our original experiences of them (Fernández 2006, Thompson 2011). I happen to 
favor option (b), but either way Kumārila’s position is untenable.  
The objector may retreat from the claim that no experiences can be 
remembered to the weaker claim that only some experiences can be remembered – 
while still maintaining that Dignāga is begging the question against her by claiming 
otherwise. In other words, the objector may present a ‘reversal argument’ that reasons 
from the falsity of Awareness to the thesis that some conscious experiences cannot be 
remembered. This reversal argument would look like this: 
R1) A subject can remember an event E only if she was aware of E when E 
occurred; 
R2) Some conscious experiences are such that their subject is unaware of them at 
the time of their occurrence; therefore, 
R3) Some conscious experiences are such that at no later time can their subject 
remember their occurrence. 
However, it is important to appreciate a certain dialectical asymmetry between 
Dignāga’s argument and this reversal argument. The question we do not wish to beg 
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is whether the awareness principle is true or not. It is therefore significant that the 
reversal argument includes among its premises the negation of the awareness 
principle, whereas Dignāga’s argument does not include among its premises the 
awareness principle; the principle shows up only in the argument’s conclusion. It is 
true, of course, that Dignāga’s argument’s premises are such as to implicitly commit 
to the conclusion. But that is just how (deductive) arguments work. The fact that 
premises which do not explicitly take a stand on the truth of Awareness, and which 
can be motivated otherwise than by citing Awareness, nonetheless entail the truth of 
Awareness should therefore be taken to represent a genuine dialectical pressure in 
favor of Awareness. 
 A more pointed objection is that the memorability claim cannot be true of 
every conscious state, since plausibly, some conscious creatures have no episodic 
memory. Some insects, for instance, may have rudimentary experiences of their 
environment without having any capacity for recollecting them.  
 There are two possible responses to this objection. One is to restrict our 
second premise to episodic-memory-capable subjects. The claim would then be that 
every conscious state of a subject endowed with the faculty of episodic memory is 
such that its subject can remember it at some later time. This will yield a 
correspondingly weaker argument, with a weaker conclusion: 
1) Only if a subject is aware of an event E when E occurs is it possible for her to 
later remember E; 
2) Every conscious state of an episodic-memory-capable subject is such that 
there is some later time at which its subject can remember it; therefore, 
3) Every conscious state of an episodic-memory-capable subject is such that its 
subject is aware of it at the time of its occurrence. 
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This conclusion is admittedly weaker. But first, it is already quite interesting and 
important, given that anyone reading this article is likely endowed with episodic 
memory. And secondly, one could probably argue abductively from the truth of the 
restricted thesis about the conscious states of memory-capable subjects to the truth of 
the unrestricted thesis about all conscious states. After all, the existence of episodic 
memory is not claimed here to generate the subject’s awareness of her conscious 
state, but merely to proffer an instructive symptom of it. 
 The second response to the ‘insect-based’ objection involves a closer 
examination of a topic I have overlooked until now: the modal force of the ‘can’ in 
the argument’s two premises. When we say that some insects may have conscious 
states that they cannot remember, we mean that it is not nomically possible for them 
to remember their conscious states.6 But this does not rule out a weaker claim, 
involving logical, conceptual, or epistemic modality. Consider an interpretation in 
terms of conceptual modality. The premise would then be that nothing in the concept 
of consciousness rules out a person’s remembering her conscious state at a later time; 
it is consequently conceivable that there should be a later time at which the person 
remembers her conscious state. The price here is that the first premise of our 
argument would have to be substantially strengthened so as to make it conceptually 
impossible to remember an event one was unaware of at the time of its occurrence. 
More specifically, the argument would look like this: 
1) For any subject S and nearby event E, if S is not aware of E when E occurs, 
then it is conceptually impossible for S to remember E later; 
2) Every conscious state is such that it is conceptually possible for there to be 
some later time at which its subject remembers its occurrence; therefore, 
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3) Every conscious state is such that its subject is aware of it at the time of its 
occurrence. 
Premise 1 here is quite strong. At the same time, note that our defense of the premise 
in the previous section was entirely a priori, appealing to conceptual observations 
about what it would take for a mental state to qualify as a genuine remembering. So 
for my part, I find no reason to shy away from a strong interpretation of Premise 1 in 
terms of conceptual modality.  
 It should be mentioned, in addition, that our two responses to the insect-based 
objection – the restriction to episodic-memory-capable subject and the appeal to 
conceptual modality – are compatible and could be deployed together.  
 It might be objected that both responses are insufficient, for we can readily 
conceive of creatures who exist for a single instant, in which they have a conscious 
experience. We may stipulate that these creatures possess the faculty of episodic 
memory (perhaps because it was beneficial to their ancestors, who enjoyed longer 
lives). Nonetheless, given that these creatures do not even exist later than their single 
conscious state, and existence is conceptually necessary for remembering, it is not 
conceptually possible for these creatures to remember their conscious state at a later 
time.  
 There are two possible responses to this objection. One is to restrict the 
premise to long-lasting creatures, with the result that the conclusion will initially 
apply only to long-lasting creatures (such as us!). But more perspicuously, we may 
introduce a certain scope disambiguation: our premise should be interpreted as saying 
not that for every conscious state there is a later time at which it is conceptually 
possible that the state be remembered, but that for every conscious state it is 
conceptually possible for there to be a later time at which the state is remembered. 
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The motivation for this wide-scope reading is clear: the conscious state of a single-
instant creature may well be memorable; it is just that the creature does not have the 
opportunity to capitalize on its memorability by actually remembering it.  
 A final objection is that at most we are entitled to assume that every conscious 
state is such that its subject can seem to remember it, not that it is such that the subject 
can actually (i.e., correctly) remember it – for nothing guarantees that the subject will 
not misremember her earlier mental states. However, this objection is a non sequitur: 
even if it is conceptually possible for the subject to misremember her experience, it is 
also conceptually possible that she (correctly) remember her experience. That is, the 
two things can be true of a conscious experience at once: that it is conceptually 
possible to remember it and that it is conceptually possible to misremember it. One 
does not exclude the other. (In general, the propositions < possibly, p > and < 




If we combine all the main modifications and refinements employed during our 
defense of the memorability argument, we obtain the following argument:7 
1) For any episodic-memory-capable subject S and nearby event E, if S is not 
aware of E when E occurs, then it is conceptually impossible for S to 
episodically remember E at some time after E’s occurrence; 
2) Every conscious state C of an episodic-memory-capable subject S is such that 
it is conceptually possible for there to be some later time at which S 
episodically remembers C;  
3) Every conscious state C is nearby relative to its subject; therefore, 
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4) Every conscious state of an episodic-memory-capable subject is such that its 
subject is aware of it at the time of its occurrence. 
As noted, 4 could then be claimed to be best explained by the notion that all subjects, 
not only episodic-memory-capable ones, are aware of their conscious states at the 
time of their occurrence.  
Just to ensure we leave no stone unturned, here is the modified hard-nosed 
variant: 
1) For any episodic-memory-capable subject S, nearby event E, and time t, such 
that E occurs at t, if S is not aware of E at t, then it is conceptually impossible 
for there to be a time t*, t*>t, such that S episodically remembers at t* the 
occurrence of E; 
2) For any episodic-memory-capable subject S, conscious state C, and time t, 
such that C is a state of S and C occurs at t, it is conceptually possible for there 
to be a time t*, t*>t, such that S episodically remembers at t* the occurrence 
of C;  
3) For any subject S and conscious state C, C is nearby relative to S; therefore, 
4) For any episodic-memory-capable subject S, conscious state C, and time t, 
such that C is a state of S and C occurs at t, S is aware of the occurrence of C 
at t. 
To my mind, no better argument for the awareness principle has been produced since 
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1 Some scholars have taken Dignāga’s goal to be to argue not just for Awareness, but 
for Reflexivity. I do not have the expertise to weigh in on this debate. My interest here 
is in remarks made by Dignāga that I take to support Awareness. In what follows, I 
will refer to this as ‘Dignāga’s argument’; but I am happy of course to rename this the 
‘Dignāga-inspired argument.’ 
 
2 Not being a Buddhist scholar myself, the translations I offer are borrowed from 
prominent Buddhist scholars. For 1:11c, I am using Kellner’s (2010: 210) translation. 
For 1:11d, I am using Ganeri’s (1999, 473). Kellner (2010, 213; 2011, 415) offers 
instead ‘memory does not apply to what was not experienced [before],’ while 
Williams (1998, 9) offers the following translation: ‘One does not see the recollection 
of that object which has not been experienced.’ These clearly all point in the same 
direction.  
 
3 I am using the symbol “>” to mean “later than” (as is common in the relevant 
discussions). 
 
4 This emphasis on the character of ‘remember’ as a success verb may be thought to 
create pressure on the second premise of the argument, since it will require that every 
conscious state be correctly memorable. But as we will see at the end of the next 
section, the pressure is not very threatening. 
 
5 This formulation is not exactly accurate, actually; but by the end of this section the 
inaccuracy will be removed. 
 
6 And when we proposed restricting the premise to episodic-memory-capable 
subjects, we attempt to defend the nomic possibility of such subject remembering 
their conscious state at a later time. 
 
7 I drop the ‘strictest sense’ qualification to avoid unnecessary complexity. 
 
8 This work was supported by the French National Research Agency’s grants ANR-
10-IDEX-0001-02 PSL and ANR-10-LABX-0087 IEC, as well as by grant 675415 of 
the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation program. For 
comments on a previous draft, I am grateful to Anna Giustina, Nico Silins, Daniel 
Stoljar, and three referees for Philosophy East & West. The paper arose out of a 
discussion at an ANU workshop on reflexive theories of consciousness from cross-
cultural perspectives. I am grateful to the audience there, especially David Chalmers, 
Bronwyn Finnigan, Jonardon Ganeri, and Andrew Lee. 
